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1. INTRODUCTION
On 21 March 1990 there was a clear-cut break with the past
when Namibia moved from de facto colonial rule to
independence. Somewhat more ambiguously, the country also
moved from authoritarianism to democracy.
The country became formally democratic, with a liberal-
democratic constitution and a multi-party state system, and
the leader of the main opposition party was able to say,
over two years after independence: 'democracy is now firmly
established in Namibia'. Vet in the fullest account to be
written of the recent history of SWAPO, Colin Leys and John
Saul, left writers disappointed that SWAPO has followed
capitalist and not socialist paths since independence, are
unwilling to accept that post-independence Namibia is
democratic in any real sense, and they speak of 'liberation
without democracy'.2 It is necessary, therefore, before we
proceed with an analysis of how and why the country's
transition towards democracy occurred, to explore the
nature of that transition and the extent to which such a
transition can indeed be said to have taken place.
The new political order ushered in at independence was
certainly strikingly different from that in place prior to
the year of formal transition in which Namibia moved to
independence. The constitution adopted by the Constituent
Assembly in February 1990 - widely called the most liberal
constitution in Africa and a model for the rest of the
continent - provided for regular elections based on
universal adult suffrage, a Bill of Fundamental Rights, ah
independent judiciary, a bicameral Parliament, and an
executive president with limited powers. Such a constitution
placed Namibia on a very different political footing from
that which had existed under South African rule.
While considerable powers had been transfered from Pretoria
to Windhoek at different times from the late 1970s, until
independence ultimate power had remained in the hands of the
South African government and its appointee, the
Administrator-General. It was the south African government
which had put in place the Transitional Government of
National Unity in June 1985, and the TGNU had not even been
legitimated by a South African-run election, on the lines of
the one conducted in December 1978. The Bill of
Fundamental Rights included in the legislation providing for
the transitional government, intended to provide the TGNU
with some legitimacy, had proved to be of very limited
practical benefit in curbing the power of that government.
While the advent of the TGNU did open some space for mass
mobilisation,* and there was a remarkably free press, one
can'nevertheless say that prior to the formal transition of
1989-90 Namibia was ruled semi-dictatorially, and that for
the majority of the populace the colonial system did not
provide democratic experience or act as a source of
democratic values but was instead seen as an alien
imposition which encouraged the idea that government could
do as it wished.6
Then during the formal transition of 1989-90 the rule of the
Adminstrator-General was monitored by the United Nations
Transitional Assistance Group, and an election was held
which the UN Special Representative declared, when the
results were announced, to have been free and fair, and one
that had given the world 'a shining lesson in democracy;
exemplary as to commitment, restraint and tolerance'. With
the new constitution in place from the day of independence,
democrats could hope that the great democratic experience
of the election would be consolidated, that the new
constitution would effectively safeguard individual
liberties and promote democratic values and practices, and
that the new government would act in such a way that the
constitution, and the institutions thereby established,
would indeed be the framework within which a flourishing
democracy would emerge. It was often said that Namibia was
in the fortunate position of being able to learn from the
negative experiences of so many other African countries,
where independence had come much earlier but where
democratic beginnings had not lasted. As Namibia began its
democratic experiment, some of those countries were trying
to return to a democratic path, in a 'second wave' of
democratisation.8
But for Leys and Saul, for whom democracy means popular
empowerment and government that is truly of the people, by
the people and for the people, there is little but the
trappings of democracy in post-independence Namibia. It is
certainly true that the Namibian constitution is 'a
profoundly conservative instrument'1 and that there has
been no significant redistribution of wealth and resources
since independence, no socio-economic transformation. A new
form of elite politics has emerged to replace the previous
one, there has been little popular participation in
government outside elections and little of the
accountability associated with a democratic culture in the
society as a whole. Clearly Namibia does not measure up to a
maximalist definition of democracy, which would exclude any
society in which vast inequalities in the distribution of
wealth exist - as they certainly do in Namibia. " But all
modern democracies are limited in the extent to which they
are democratic, and purist or ideal-type definitions of
democracy are of limited utility when applied to the real
world. It is much more helpful to speak of democratisation,
a historical process, and to pose the question of the extent
to which a country is or has been democratic in more than a
formal sense. A brief investigation of that question in
relation to Namibia since independence would seem to suggest
that there is no easy answer, not least because insufficient
time has elapsed for a verdict to be pronounced.
On the one hand, one can cite ways in which the Swapo
government has acted in a democratic manner and spirit: the
remarkable extent to which it has promoted national
reconciliation, for example, or the extraordinarily open way
in which the Land Conference was held in June 1991,
;. with the Prime Minister himself in the chair, a
striking example of how, in a country with a population as
small as Namibia's, popular views can be aired and presented
to government.12 The Swapo congress of December 1991,
likewise, displayed democratic, as well as autocratic,
features. 1 3 The human rights provisions in the constitution
have not been violated, and the press remains free. And it
is possible to lay great stress on the fact that a second
nation-wide election, this time for regional and local
candidates, and without an external monitoring presence,
was held successfully toward the end of 1992, and that
preparations are already underway for another Assembly
election within the next year, as provided for in the
constitution.
On the other hand, those who wish to define democracy as
meaning more than periodic elections can point, say, to the
fact that national reconciliation has meant retention of the
status quo, and to examples of the govenment acting without
popular consultation or a popular mandate , and failing to
take popular wishes into account. It has refused to hold an
enquiry into what went on in the Angolan camps in the 1980s,
for example, and has done very little to implement, say,
the resolutions of the Land conference. Much is done in
secret and without full disclosure, following the example
set by the Constituent Assembly itself, which in November
1989 referred the drawing up of the new constitution to a
standing committee which met behind closed doors. Not only
was the public denied information about the debates in the
committee, but when the new constitution emerged to be
ratified by the Assembly, there was no question of
submitting it to a referendum.15 As the parties had by no
means clearly spelt out what they were to propose to the
Constituent Assembly during the election campaign, there was
really no popular involvement in the writing of the
constitution. Writing of the period since independence. Leys
and Saul speak of popular dispowerment.
It is not the purpose of this paper to conduct a detailed
examination of the post-independence balance sheet or of the
prospects for the consolidation of Namibia's fledgling
democracy. Political scientists have already begun to
undertake those tasks.17 The focus of this paper is,
instead, historical. It will proceed on the assumption that
the jury is still out about the consolidation of democracy
in Namibia, but that a basis was laid for democratic
practices, and that therefore it is possible to talk of a
transition to a kind of democracy in Namibia. The remaining
discussion will reflect on the reasons for that transition.
Besides analysing some of the pre-independence origins of
the present democratic experiment in Namibia, mention will
be made of factors which militated against a democratic
outcome, which indeed appeared unlikely not all that long
before independence. By looking at aspects of the
decolonisation process in Namibia, the paper will attempt
to offer some elements of an explanation - for a fully
comprehensive explanation would require far more space - of
why, in the event, the basis was laid for democratisation in
Namibia. Such an examination of the Namibian case may be
useful for those seeking to understand, and by understanding
to promote, democratisation elsewhere.
2. ON THE POSSIBILITIES OF A DEMOCRATIC OUTCOME
It was by no means inevitable that a democratic order would
emerge in Namibia at independence. The country had, after
all, endured a long and bitter decolonisation conflict. A
twenty-three year long war had been fought between SWAPO and
the South African occupation regime, a war which had to some
extent taken on the character of a civil war. Much of the
north of the country had long been under a brutal
occupation; much of the rest of Namibian society had by the
late 1980s become highly militarised. Right-wing whites were
known to be antipathetic to independence under a SWAPO
government, to be heavily armed, and to have close links
with the far right and elements in the security forces in
South Africa. The gross inequalities and resultant class
structure were hardly conducive to democracy. *8
Before independence, as we have already noted, there was at
best very limited forms of democratic practices within the
country, confined to a section of the population. Such
elections as were held between 1978 and 1988 - for a
Constituent Assembly in December 1978 and thereafter for
ethnic authorities - were organised by the South African
authorities, involved a relatively small proportion of the
total population, and, with only the partial exception of
the 1978 election, were of little political significance.
SWAPO, though never formally banned within the territory,
nevertheless suffered severe repression, and only from 1986,
thanks to some space opened by the advent of the TGNU and
by the courts, was able to mobilise openly and hold public
meetings within the country. Given this repression, it was
hardly possible for SWAPO to promote a democratic culture
within the country, and very little was done in that
direction.
The SWAPO leadership in exile, on the other hand, could
have made clear its commitment to a post-independence
democracy and tried to act in a way compatible with that
goal. That it did neither requires some explanation and
elaboration. It is hardly convincing to argue - as its
members have on occasion - that SWAPO in exile could not be
democratic because of the war in which it was engaged with
South Africa, and the vicious tactics used against it. Nor
can it be claimed with much justification that it did not
profess its adherence to democracy more strongly because it
took it for granted, as the antithesis of authoritarian
South African rule, and that it therefore did not need to
proclaim it or elaborate on its meaning.
In considering the practices and professions of SWAPO in
exile, it is now possible to draw upon the work of Leys and
Saul, who show that it was organised, not on democratic but
on extremely hierarchical and authoritarian lines, and who
go on to argue that the leadership worked actively to
suppress such democratic tendencies as emerged in the
organisation in exile from time to time and in Namibia
itself, fearing that such tendencies might pose a threat to
its position. In 1975-6 a campaign within the organisation
for the holding of a representative conqress was met with
harsh' repression from the leadership. A decade later,
unhappy with the grass-roots mobilisation then taking place
in Namibia, the leadership worked to discourage it. 2 1 And
the anti-democratic culture in SWAPO made possible in the
1980s a massive security crisis, the so-called 'spy-drama',
which led to the most heinous crimes being committed in the
name of the organisation. Though some leading members did
eventually come to decry what had been done, the most
favourable estimation of the response would have to be that
it was extremely muted. " Leys and Saul seem to suggest
that the survival of neo-colonial socio-economic structures
after independence was in part a result of the suppression
of democracy in the movement before independence.
Nor did SWAPO in exile actively promote democracy through
its pronouncements and statements of policy. In all the
years prior to the actual implementation of UN Resolution
435, the only statements to spell out democratic ideas in
any detail were drawn up in 1975 and 1976. Both were non-
official documents, never circulated by the organisation.
The first, a 'Discussion Document on the Constitution of an
Independent Namibia', was drafted by Cedric Thornberry on
behalf of SWAPO in 1975, and was clearly a bid for
diplomatic support at a time when the Turnhalle conference
was about to meet in Windhoek. It spoke of parliamentary
democracy, an executive president, a one or two chamber
legislature, a comprehensive and entrenched bill of rights,
and even of protection for property and the pension rights
of public servants. Though this document was presented to
the Executive Committee of SWAPQ in Lusaka, that body seems
never to have responded to it. The second document, the
so-called National Programme drawn up in late 1976, spoke of
the goal of popular and democratic government based on
universal adult suffrage and complete freedoms, but did add
that people 'guilty of betraying the struggle or those who
have been opposed to it' would be deprived of voting
rights.25
The main official document issued by SWAPO in exile, the one
presented as party policy on numerous occasions in different
fora,2 was very different to these other two, and did not
emphasise democratic values or goals. This was the Political
Programme adopted by an enlarged Central Committee meeting
in August 1976, the first and last such programme adopted by
the movement in more than two decades in exile. Dobell
interprets it as a 'calculated response to the challenges
then facing the movement', the challenge of trying to gain
recognition as a government-in-exile, of responding to the
so-called 'Shipanga' crisis, and of a strategic realignment,
towards the MPLA in Angola, then allowing SWAPO to establish
itself in southern Angola, and towards the Soviet Union and
Eastern Bloc countries, the main suppliers of arms and
material to the organisation. The Political Programme
was, according to Dobell, a highly pragmatic document.
Whatever its purpose, however, it spoke of the aim of the
struggle as being the building of 'a new democratic society
based on the principles of socialism'' 2 8 While there was
certainly ambiguities in the document, democracy was
neither defined nor elaborated, and what was emphasised was,
rather, social and economic transformation. The phrase that
most readers of the document remembered, and the one most
noticed by commentators and supporters alike, was
'scientific socialism'. For over a decade this document
helped give the South African government ammunition to
support its case that SWAPO was a radical Marxist
organisation and therefore should not be allowed to come to
power in Namibia. Not only was the radicalism of SWAPO's
policy deplored by its critics; it was argued that, as so
radical a programme would not be accepted peacefully by the
people of Namibia, it would have to be imposed, and that
could not possibly be done but by force, in an anti-
democratic manner.
In the late 1980s SWAPO's policy shifted from 'scientific
socialism' to acceptance of a mixed economy, and as it did
so there was more talk of democracy and the protections of
freedoms, but in vague terms. The party's July 1989
Election Manifesto began to present in outline the political
system it wished to see in place after independence, but it
left the door open to a one-party system, 3 0 and it was
really only after the November 1989 election, when the
Constituent Assembly met, that the details of SWAPO
democratic vision emerged. It was then that SWAPO, at the
first meeting of the Assembly on 21 November, proposed the
adoption of the 1982 Constitutional Principles (to be
discussed below) as the basis of the constitution, and it
was only in subsequent debates in the Assembly that SWAPO's
detailed political wishes were presented. These did not
always find their way into the final constitution, for
compromises were made with other parties to reach consensus
on the overall package. *
Before the agreement to implement UN Resolution 435, reached
at the end of 1988, prospects for a successful transition to
democracy in Namibia did not look good. The long conflict,
the history of authoritarian South African rule, the talk of
a violent seizure of power, the behaviour of SWAPO in exile
and its commitment to radical transformation rather than to
a democratic vision, the fact that only a handful of
Namibians in exile had- any experience of living in a
democratic country : these did not bode well for such a
transition. Even when implementation began, there remained a
strong possibility that the transition would be derailed.
Yet in the event the transition to independence was
remarkably smooth, and the basis was laid for a democratic
future. Let us now turn to consider some of the reasons why
this happened, focusing not on the reasons for the success
of the transition to independence, which has been considered
elsewhere, but rather on what promoted democratisation.
3. ON THE ORIGINS OF NAMIBIAN DEMOCRACY
In Security Council Resolution 385 of December 1976 and
other such statements, the UN made it clear that the future
of Namibia should be determined, not by force of arms and a
seizure of power, but by a democratic election for a
Constituent Assembly, held under UN supervision and control.
When negotiations began in 1977 between the Western Contact
Group and the parties involved in the conflict - South
Africa, SWAPO and the Frontline states - it was to achieve
that goal of a democratic election leading to independence.
The SWAPO leadership, deciding that a diplomatic strategy
was more likely to win independence than the armed struggle,
welcomed Resolution 385, and by July 1978 had been brought
to accept, through pressure from both the Contact Group and
the Frontline states, a set of Western proposals which spelt
out the manner in which the democratic election was to be
held. It was clearly the expectation of the Western
countries that the very process of participating in such an
election would help instil democratic practices in the
participants, as indeed turned out to be the case. While
some in SWAPO remained opposed to negotiations and to the
compromises made in the negotiations, the organisation as
such committed itself to a diplomatic strategy to achieve
power through negotations, which meant accepting the Western
plan for a transition based on a democratic process, and one
which therefore laid the basis for a future democracy.
The most important amendment and extension of the Western
plan occurred in July 1982, when both South Africa and SWAPO
accepted a set of so-called Constitutional Principles drawn
up by the Contact Group. These Principles were not proposed
to ensure a democratic future in Namibia, but rather to meet
South African fears of the consequences of a SWAPO victory
in a UN-monitored election. 3 3 The Principles were both a
set of rules to govern the election of the Constituent
Assembly, including a requirement that the Assembly would
adopt the constitution as a whole by a two-thirds majority,
and a list of substantive principles to be included in the
constitution itself, some of them civil and political rights
to be found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The 1982 Principles included many of the points in the 1975
non-official Swapo document already mentioned.
SWAPO tried to resist the introduction of the Principles
into the negotiations, and only agreed to accept them under
strong pressure from the Presidents of the Frontline
states.3 After independence a leading SWAPO official argued
that the Principles were 'the very basis of our struggle for
equality and freedom, democracy and social justice', and
that they were only opposed because they were designed to
suit South Africa, the two-thirds requirement being 'a
deliberate attempt to deny SWAPO a clear victory by raising
the ceiling'. 3 6 It was difficult for SWAPO not to believe
that it would gain two thirds of the vote in a free and fair
election, and if it did the two thirds requirement would be
of no significance. Moreover, the Principles were not
embodied in a UN resolution, for the fiction was upheld that
Resolution 435 was not being amended. The question remained
open, therefore, whether they were binding on the
Constituent Assembly, and SWAPO did not commit itself to
adhering'to the Principles.38 On the other hand, Swapo must
also have known that if it did not obtain the two thirds
majority in the election, it would be under enormous
international pressure to adhere to ,the Principles. In the
election - in which a remarkable 98% of registered voters
cast their votes - it received only 57.3% of the vote.
Concerned to get the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly
over as quickly as possible, so as to move on to
independence and to power, it quickly proposed at the
opening session of the Assembly that the Principles be
accepted, which they then were, unanimously.
The election campaign itself did much to promote the cause
of democracy. A Code of Conduct, drawn up by the UN Special
Representative, and monitored by UNTAG, committed the
various parties participating to democratic practices,39 and
it worked so successfully that Ahtisaari was to regard it as
one of UNTAG's main achievements. 4 Ahtisaari interpreted
the UNTAG role as including the creation of the right
environment for the holding of a democratic election, and as
a vital part of doing that UNTAG spent much time and energy
on the spreading of information about the election
throughout the country. 4 1 During the campaign, SWAPO was
forced to some extent to defend its record, and it was
drawn into negotiations with parties across the political
spectrum. This at a time when there was much talk of the
promotion of multi-party democracy elsewhere in Africa. The
election itself, thanks to extensive and close UNTAG
monitoring, went off with hardly any electoral irregularity
of the kind which so marred the 1994 South African
election.42 The Berlin Wall fell as the Namibian election
was held. In moving in a democratic direction, and accepting
a pluralist form of democracy based on the rule of law and
fundamental freedoms SWAPO was moving in the same direction
of much of the rest of the world. It knew that it had to go
that route if it were to attract the Western aid it sought,
at a time when aid was no longer forthcoming from its former
communist supporters, countries which were disappearing or
in crisis. Without a two thirds majority, SWAPO knew that to
govern in conditions of stability it had to compromise and
could not afford to act dictatorially. It remained worried
about threats of violence and destabilisation, which it
sought to defuse by acting with caution and tact. All these
considerations helped promote the establishment of the basis
for democracy in Namibia after independence.
4. TOWARDS A CONCLUSION
It now seems almost inconceivable that there could have been
any other outcome. The Western settlement plan meant a
democratic election for a Constituent Assembly. If the
Constitutional Principles were adhered to, the constitution
that Assembly wrote had to be democratic. But had there been
no implementation of Resolution 435, if implementation had
been derailed, or if the Principles had been violated, the
basis for Namibian democracy might not have been laid. It
was, however, highly unlikely that after a "UN-supervised
election, a SWAPO-dominated Constituent Assembly would have
written a non-democratic constitution. As it was, a
successful election brought victory to a party which
committed itself to national reconciliation, in the
Constituent Assembly there was a remarkable spirit of give
and take, and the result was a liberal democratic
constitution. Had the new government attempted after
independence to carry out its earlier policy of large-scale,
radical social and economic transformation, the democratic
experiment might have ended almost before it had begun. But
on the other hand, if the government does not in the future
show greater concern than it has since independence for
popular involvement, accountability, and the creation of a
10
more just society through significant socio-economic reform,
it is unlikely that the experiment will survive
indefinitely.
Confidence about the future of democracy in Namibia would be
greater had it deeper roots and emerged from an indigenous
political tradition, or had the ruling party a longer
history of democratic commitment. It has been the argument
of this paper that the 'democratic transition' was largely
the result of ideas and pressures coming from outside,
rather than from within. 4 3 SWAPO wanted independence above
all else, and though some of its members dreamt of using
armed force to topple the South Africans from power, the
leadership was realistic enough to know that the route to
independence lay through a democratic election and accepting
a democratic constitution. Though for long opposed to the
implementation of UN Resolution 435 because of the
likelihood that SWAPO would come to power as a result of a
one person one vote UN-monitored election, the South African
government had by December 1988 been persuaded to take a
calculated risk, as part of a deal involving other matters,
and allow such an election to take place.44 The South
African administration then sought to influence that
election to ensure that SWAPO did not obtain two thirds of
the vote, but was otherwise keen, in the interests of
stability, to see a democratic outcome. 4 S Now in the
post-independence era the forces promoting future
consolidation of democracy must largely be internal ones,
though foreign aid and other forms of assistance may depend
upon the continuation of 'good government' . The young
Namibian democracy, therefore, remains fragile, especially
without a vibrant civil society of the kind that exists in
South Africa. Yet so long as the democratic institutions
born at independence survive, there will at least remain
the possibility that in the course of time democratic values
will take deeper root, and that a truly democratic culture,
drawing upon popular commitment, will emerge to bolster and
underpin the democratic framework of government.
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